In "Fateful Triangle," Noam Chomsky examines the attitudes and policies of key players in the Middle East conflict since 1967, focusing on the United States, Israel, the Palestinians, and the Arab states including the PLO. He highlights the ideological interpretations of these policies in the U.S., which significantly influence both public perception and policy development.
For the United States, Chomsky identifies a persistent internal conflict between two opposing policy approaches: rejectionism and accommodation. The Rogers Plan, proposed in 1969 by Secretary of State William Rogers, embodied the international consensus for peace and compromise. In stark contrast, Henry Kissinger, a dominant figure in U.S. foreign policy from 1970, advocated for a rejectionist stance, promoting a “Greater Israel” with control over the occupied territories. This approach, aligning with Kissinger's vague but discernible views in his memoirs, effectively became U.S. policy.
Chomsky notes that while sectors of American corporate capitalism, including those with interests in the Middle East, favored the international consensus, this view lost to the concept of Israel as a "strategic asset." The ongoing U.S. policy debate hinges on whether rejectionism or a move toward peaceful resolution aligns best with U.S. interests. The latter option considers a Palestinian mini-state, likely contained within a Jordanian-Israeli military alliance and dependent on conservative, pro-American Arab states.
Chomsky criticizes certain left-liberal circles in the U.S. for using the oil companies' preference for international consensus to support their own rejectionist views. He argues that this logic is flawed and inconsistent with the reality of U.S. aid to Israel. He contends that the U.S., despite internal policy debates, has consistently pursued a rejectionist policy, with little public discourse reflecting the complexity and nuances of these internal conflicts. The underlying goal across all factions in elite U.S. circles, he asserts, is to maintain control over Middle East petroleum resources and manage the flow of petrodollars, with the main tactical question being how to achieve this most effectively.
Chomsky then discusses Israel's policy debates, noting their narrow scope, focused on two major political groupings: the Labor Alignment and the Likud coalition. Both, despite superficial differences, agree on controlling the occupied territories and deny Palestinian national rights west of the Jordan. This shared rejectionist stance extends to defining Israel as the state of the Jewish people, excluding its non-Jewish citizens.
Both parties justify their stance on security, but Chomsky argues this is a standard justification for any state's actions. He criticizes the U.S. focus on Israel's security while ignoring the Palestinians' security concerns, pointing out the inherent racism in this approach. The international consensus offers a solution to these dual security problems, but its realization remains unlikely.
Israel's rejectionism, Chomsky argues, is also economically motivated. The occupied territories provide a labor force and a market for Israeli goods, contributing significantly to Israel's economy. Israel's dependence on the West Bank for water resources further complicates the potential for withdrawal. The Lebanon war led to Israel's control over West Bank water resources, highlighting the political nature of its actions. The U.S. peace plan's special mention of Israel's rights to West Bank water underlines this issue's importance.
Chomsky discusses the differences between Israel's two major political groups, Labor and Likud, regarding policies for the occupied territories. Both follow a rejectionist approach but differ in their preferred arrangements.
The Labor Party's approach, known as the Allon Plan, proposed retaining significant areas including the Golan Heights, Gaza Strip, parts of Eastern Sinai, and much of the West Bank, while avoiding the annexation of densely populated Arab areas to manage the "demographic problem." This plan aimed to control these regions without fully integrating the Arab population.
The Likud coalition, led by Begin, favored extending Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza, a subtler approach than outright annexation. This would allow Israel to control these areas and confine the Arab population to smaller regions, avoiding the issue of citizenship for Arabs and maintaining the Jewish demographic majority.
Both parties agree on the economic and strategic benefits of controlling these territories. The Labor Party seeks to manage Western opinion with a more conciliatory public tone, while Likud is less concerned with Western perceptions and more direct in its actions and rhetoric.
The Reagan administration's September 1982 proposals elicited a qualified interest from Israel's Labor Party, partly due to its traditional diplomatic style and partly because these proposals were somewhat compatible with Labor's positions, though not with Likud's demand for total sovereignty. Labor's show of interest also aimed to improve its electoral prospects by contrasting with the government's stance. Labor's talk of "territorial compromise" or "trading peace for territory" appears conciliatory to American ears but is essentially rejectionist, similar in reality to Likud's concept of "sovereignty."
Historically, there have been several "territorial compromises" in Palestine, including the 1947 UN partition and the 1949 armistice. However, further compromise along the lines of the Allon Plan would effectively eliminate Palestinian self-determination. The notion that Transjordan's 1922 exclusion from the Jewish national home was a compromise is contested due to the negligible Jewish population there at the time.
Both major Israeli political groups have consistently rejected national rights for the Palestinian Arabs. Foundational attitudes in Israeli politics, expressed by leaders like David Ben-Gurion, Moshe Dayan, and Golda Meir, denied the existence of a distinct Palestinian people or their attachment to the land. These views led to policies disregarding Palestinian rights and aspirations.
Labor and Likud, while differing in rhetoric, share the perspective that Jordan is the Palestinian state, rejecting the idea of a third state between Israel and Jordan. This position contrasts with the smaller peace movement in Israel, which aligns more with the international consensus. Both major parties in Israel, through their policies and historical statements, exhibit a clear form of rejectionism, often overlooked in U.S. perspectives.
The rejectionism of Israel's major political groups is obscured in the United States through two strategies. First, "rejectionism" is often understood only as the denial of Jewish national rights, implicitly assuming that Palestinians do not possess equivalent human rights. Second, Israel's readiness to negotiate with Arab states is highlighted, while its consistent exclusion of Palestinians from these negotiations is overlooked. This creates a perception of Israel as open to negotiation, masking its rejectionist stance towards Palestinian rights.
This American discourse misinterprets terms like "territorial compromise" and "negotiated settlement" to obscure the reality of Israel's rejectionism. For example, Arnold Forster of the Anti-Defamation League criticized the U.S. government for linking an Israel-Lebanon peace to a broader settlement including the West Bank, under the pretext of establishing a "healthy, peaceful relationship" between Israel and Lebanon. However, this perspective fails to recognize that such a relationship, as proposed, would further Israeli sovereignty over the occupied territories and deny basic human rights to Palestinians.
Forster's argument, reflecting the belief that Palestinians do not have rights equal to Jews, supports the concept of a "Greater Israel" and the subjugation of Lebanon to Israeli interests. This situation parallels historical colonial relationships, where a dominant power imposes its will on a weaker entity for economic and strategic benefits. Despite the apparent human rights facade, this stance aligns with entrenched racist assumptions prevalent in educated Western societies, which often fail to acknowledge the underlying issues of power imbalance and denial of Palestinian rights.
The attitudes and experiences of the Palestinian population in the occupied territories, namely the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, are often overlooked in U.S. discourse, which implicitly assumes their perspectives are less significant. This population, referred to as "Judea and Samaria" by both Israeli political parties, has consistently shown support for the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and an independent Palestinian state, despite Israeli occupation and interference.
In the 1976 West Bank municipal elections, despite Israeli efforts to influence the outcome, elected officials openly supported the PLO. This outcome was initially seen as a success of the occupation but later attributed to PLO pressure by Israeli governments. Notably, even prominent conservative figures in the territories expressed support for the PLO.
A 1982 poll by the PORI Institute, an Israeli public opinion research organization, revealed overwhelming support among West Bank residents for an independent Palestinian state led by the PLO. This contrasts sharply with the preferences of the U.S. and Israeli governments, which favored different representatives for the Palestinian people.
The case of Bassam Shak’a, a popular West Bank mayor, exemplifies the challenges faced by Palestinian leaders. Shak’a, who lost both legs in a terrorist attack believed to be perpetrated by Jewish settlers, received no justice as investigations into the attack were minimal and ineffective. His subsequent dismissal and harassment by the Israeli government, including travel restrictions and denial of press access, highlight the systemic suppression of Palestinian voices.
This situation reflects a broader pattern of neglect and suppression of Palestinian perspectives and rights, both within the occupied territories and in international discourse, particularly in the U.S.
The Village Leagues, formed in the West Bank by the Israeli military government and led by Mustafa Dudin, are largely perceived as an Israeli attempt to undermine the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and control the Palestinian population. Despite extensive Israeli support and efforts to impose their rule, these Leagues are widely unpopular among Palestinians, who see them as instruments of Israeli occupation.
Journalists covering the West Bank acknowledge the lack of genuine support for the Leagues, despite Israeli efforts to promote them. For example, a meeting in Hebron to announce the Leagues' expanded role was heavily guarded by Israeli forces and attended by representatives under duress, highlighting the artificial nature of their support.
In contrast, the U.S. media sometimes misrepresents the situation, portraying the Leagues and their leaders as more popular and legitimate than they are in reality. Israeli measures to enforce the rule of the Leagues include financial incentives, the provision of arms, and coercion of Palestinians to engage with them for their daily needs.
The regime of Menachem Milson, who initiated these policies, was marked by severe repression, including arrests, expulsions, and suppression of political expression. These actions were part of a broader strategy to undermine Palestinian social institutions and replace them with Israeli-controlled structures like the Village Leagues.
Despite being positioned as representatives of Palestinian interests, the Leagues and their leaders, including Dudin, are seen as collaborators or quislings by the majority of Palestinians. Even Dudin has called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces and settlements from the occupied territories, a stance that contrasts with his role as an Israeli-appointed leader.
The Palestinian population's consistent support for the PLO and an independent Palestinian state, alongside their rejection of Israeli-imposed autonomy, demonstrates the failure of Israeli efforts to control and manipulate Palestinian political representation through the Village Leagues.
The PORI Institute survey on West Bank opinion revealed a significant indifference towards Israeli political parties, with only 0.9% favoring Likud and 2% preferring Labor, while 93% showed complete indifference. Regarding the Camp David accords, only 2% saw it as beneficial to Palestinians, with 88% considering it a hindrance. This contradicts the portrayal of Camp David in U.S. media and discourse as a significant "peace process."
The survey results reflect the experiences of Palestinians under occupation by both the Labor and Likud governments. Their low regard for the Labor Party challenges the narrative that the party's occupation was a model of Arab-Israeli coexistence or a step towards compromise with Palestinians.
In the U.S., Palestinian perspectives are often disregarded, as their rights are not recognized on par with Israeli Jews. This disregard is evident in media representations, where there are claims of uncertainty about Palestinian public opinion, despite available poll data. The New Republic, for example, denies the existence of reliable means to gauge Palestinian opinion, contradicting available evidence.
The preferences of Palestinians in the occupied territories are mirrored among Arab citizens of Israel. Even moderate Arab leaders in Israel, who have not been supporters of Yasser Arafat, acknowledge his role as a representative of the Palestinian people following the Lebanon war. This sentiment is common in the Israeli Arab community, reflecting a broad consensus on Palestinian statehood and the PLO's legitimacy.
In the post-1967 period, the Arab states and the PLO initially held a rejectionist stance similar to that of Israel and the U.S. However, this stance began to change, notably with Egyptian President Nasser's 1970 declaration advocating for peace with Israel upon its evacuation of occupied territories and settlement of the Palestinian refugee issue. This proposal, aligning with the international consensus, was ignored by Israel.
Nasser's successor, Anwar Sadat, further pursued peace, offering a full peace treaty to Israel in 1971, contingent on returning to pre-1967 borders. Israel rejected this offer, backed by the U.S., which was influenced by Kissinger's belief in Israel's unchallengeable power and his preference for a strategic stalemate in the region. Sadat's peace initiatives, including his 1977 trip to Jerusalem, were consistently more favorable to Israel than later proposals.
The 1973 war, initiated by Sadat, shifted U.S. policy as it became clear that Egypt and the oil-producing states could not be overlooked. This led to the U.S. accepting Egypt as a client state and removing it from the Arab-Israeli conflict through the Sinai agreement. Subsequent efforts by Egypt and other Arab states for a comprehensive peace settlement were consistently thwarted by U.S. vetoes at the UN, most notably in 1976 when a resolution for a two-state solution, supported by the PLO, was vetoed by the U.S.
The PLO, often perceived as the instigator of various peace proposals, was consistent in supporting a two-state solution, but their efforts were repeatedly blocked or disregarded by Israel and the U.S. The narrative in the U.S. often misrepresents this history, overlooking the shifts in Arab and PLO positions towards peace and the consistent rejectionism of Israel and the U.S. in this context.
In the immediate aftermath of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, both the Arab states and the PLO held a rejectionist stance similar to Israel and the U.S. However, this began to change, especially with Egyptian President Nasser's 1970 declaration favoring peace with Israel if it withdrew from occupied territories and addressed the Palestinian refugee issue. This shift towards a more conciliatory stance was not reciprocated by Israel or acknowledged by the U.S.
Anwar Sadat, succeeding Nasser, pursued peace with Israel, offering a full peace treaty in 1971, which Israel rejected. The U.S., influenced by Kissinger's strategy, supported Israel's rejection and sought a stalemate in the region. Sadat's attempts were further ignored, leading to the 1973 war which shifted U.S. policy.
Post-1973, Egypt and other Arab states continued to advocate for a comprehensive peace settlement. In 1976, a U.N. Security Council Resolution calling for a two-state solution was vetoed by the U.S. The Arab states, including the PLO, repeatedly expressed willingness for peace based on pre-1967 borders and the establishment of a Palestinian state, but these efforts were consistently rebuffed by Israel and the U.S.
Sadat's 1977 trip to Jerusalem, often portrayed as a turning point in his stance, was actually a continuation of his long-standing peace efforts. The resulting Camp David accords removed Egypt from the Arab-Israeli conflict, allowing Israel to maintain control over the occupied territories. The U.S. played a key role in this process, maintaining dominance in diplomatic efforts and sidelining other major powers.
The historical record of Arab and PLO efforts towards peace contrasts sharply with the common narrative of Arab intransigence and U.S.-Israeli attempts at accommodation. Much of the actual history, including Sadat's pre-1977 peace initiatives and U.N. resolutions supported by Arab states and the PLO, has been largely ignored or forgotten in mainstream discourse.
Amnon Kapeliouk described Egyptian President Sadat's willingness to enter a peace agreement with Israel as a historic event in Israel-Arab relations. However, this perspective contrasts sharply with the narrative presented in the U.S. media, particularly in the New York Times. An example is Eric Pace's encomium to Sadat in the Times, which omitted the real history of Sadat's pre-1977 peace efforts and portrayed him as reversing Egypt's policy only with his 1977 Jerusalem trip.
Mark Helprin's contribution to the New York Times Magazine debate on how Americans should relate to Israel post-Lebanon war and Beirut massacres further illustrates this historical engineering. Helprin set up a false dichotomy between those who would see Israel fall and those who support its aggrandizement, ignoring the real spectrum of opinion. He then presented a distorted view of Middle East history, suggesting that the Arab states and the PLO are unilaterally responsible for conflict and that Israel's actions in Lebanon were restrained.
Helprin's article, along with other similar narratives in U.S. media, demonstrates a significant bias and manipulation of historical facts, serving to support established power and ideology. This "historical engineering" exemplifies Walter Lippmann's concept of "the manufacture of consent," where dominant perspectives in the media shape public opinion and democracy, often obscuring the true complexity and history of international conflicts.